Motor Vehicle Accident Category Archives — Page 27 of 28 — South Florida Injury Attorneys Blog Published by South Florida Injury Lawyers

August 19, 2015

Florida’s First District Court of Appeals Rules that Statute of Limitation Applies in Auto Accident Case

Although the law is fundamentally concerned with justice, justice often requires that a party take timely action to redress her harm. Indeed, negligence cases are subject to various statutes of limitations, and many would-be litigants have gone to court only to find that their claims, irrespective of their merits, have been lost because of the passage of time. Although many statute of limitations cases relate only to a plaintiff’s failure to take timely action, a recent decision from the First District Court of Appeals, Russ v. Williams, involved an intriguing situation when a defendant’s “mischief” helped assure that a plaintiff’s claims would be time-barred.

Although the merits of the claims were ultimately not reached in Russ, the case arose from a motor vehicle crash on May 15, 2009. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s negligence led to the accident and filed the complaint in this case in November 2012. The complaint was served on the defendant on March 1, 2013. On May 23, 2013, one week after the statute of limitations had elapsed, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that his wife was actually the one operating the vehicle at the time of the crash and was the sole owner of the vehicle. The plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to add the defendant’s wife as the proper party. The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant’s wife was an entirely new party and that any claims against his wife were time-barred because the statute of limitations period had passed. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint but reserved judgment on any statute of limitations issues. The claims against the original defendant were dismissed.

June 3, 2015

Fourth District Court of Appeal Addresses Harmless Error Rule in Auto Accident Decision

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

One of the most common arguments on appeal following a trial is whether evidence was erroneously presented to the jury. Although inappropriate evidence can affect a jury’s determination, appeals courts are wary to allow a new trial in every case that involves an evidentiary ruling with which it disagrees. Accordingly, the “harmless error rule” limits overturning a jury verdict to only those situations when the evidence is shown to have had some material impact on the jury’s ruling. Courts have different standards for harmless error, and the Supreme Court of Florida recently clarified its pre-existing harmless error jurisprudence for civil cases in Special v. West Boca Medical Center. In West Boca, which arose from the appeal of a Fourth District Court of Appeal decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that harmless error in civil cases requires that “the beneficiary of the error must prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.” 39 Fla. L. Weekly S676 (Fla. Nov. 13, 2014). The Fourth District previously applied a “more likely than not” standard for harmless error and has been forced to revise several of its decisions in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Among these decisions is Hurtado v. DeSouza, which involved prejudicial evidence introduced in an automobile accident trial.

The plaintiff in Hurtado filed suit after being rear-ended by another driver while stopped at a traffic light. Prior to trial, the defendant stipulated to liability, leaving only causation and damages to be determined by the jury. At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney stated in his opening statement that immediately following the accident the defendant didn’t check in on the plaintiff or apologize. The defendant’s counsel called for a sidebar with the judge, who ruled that the statement could be admitted. Afterward, the plaintiff’s counsel made another statement on the defendant’s possible effort to flee, to which the defense counsel objected. A third comment was subsequently made, and the defendant’s counsel moved for a mistrial or a curative instruction to the jury, both of which the trial court denied. In his testimony, the plaintiff noted the defendant’s failure to check on him or his family and the defendant’s desire to leave the scene of the accident. The trial judge permitted the testimony but ultimately directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s mental anguish claims. Following the directed verdict, the trial judge read a curative instruction to the jury, directing them to ignore references to the defendant’s failure to admit negligence sooner as irrelevant given the court’s determination on mental anguish damages. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for over one million dollars for permanent injury. The defendant appealed the jury verdict.

May 6, 2015

Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal Addresses Seatbelt Comparative Negligence Defense

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

In a recent decision, Jones v. Alayon, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed several questions arising from trial in an auto accident negligence case. At trial, the jury found that the decedent was, in part, responsible for his death because the evidence established he had not been wearing a seatbelt at the time of the crash. Among various arguments the decedent’s estate raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the estate on the defendant’s seatbelt defense because the undisputed evidence showed that the seatbelt was actually inoperable.

Alayon was brought by the daughter of the decedent as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The defendant in this case was the driver of the vehicle that rear-ended the decedent’s vehicle, which caused it to strike a guardrail and turn over. The decedent was ejected from the vehicle. The decedent died as a result of either ejection from the vehicle or being struck by other oncoming cars. The defendant was a off-duty police officer, who fled after striking the decedent’s vehicle and falsely reported that it had been stolen. At the time of the civil trial, the decedent was incarcerated on charges related to the hit-and-run. The defendant conceded liability but contended that his negligence didn’t result in the decedent’s death. Instead, the defendant argued that the decedent was comparatively negligent because he failed to wear a seatbelt.

February 25, 2015

Fourth District Addresses Issues Surrounding Post-Injury Surveillance in Florida and Adopts Bright-Line Rule

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Following the initiation of a personal injury suit, many defendants will start to conduct covert surveillance of the plaintiff in hope of uncovering evidence that can later to used to impeach inconsistent testimony. Beyond obvious privacy concerns, the production and use of surveillance footage raises numerous legal issues related to authenticity. Accordingly, it is well settled that defendants are required to turn over surveillance footage that they intend to use at trial during the discovery process. However, there is often an argument about when the defendant must turn over this footage. These timing issues are at the core of the discussion in a recent decision from Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, Hankerson v. Wiley.

Hankerson started with an alleged act of auto negligence, which ultimately led the plaintiff in this case to bring suit against the other driver. During the course of pre-trial discovery, the defendant acquired surveillance footage of the plaintiff, which the plaintiff then sought to acquire prior to her deposition. The trial court granted an order that would permit the plaintiff to view the surveillance footage prior to her deposition. Following issuance of this order, the defendant sought immediate certiorari review by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, arguing that permitting the plaintiff to view the footage prior to having an opportunity to depose her would lead to irreparable harm that warranted immediate review by the appellate court. Thus, there were two issues before the Court of Appeal: 1) whether the harm attendant to turning over footage is of a degree that warrants immediate appellate review; and 2) whether the defendant could be ordered to turn over work product surveillance footage prior to deposing the plaintiff.

February 11, 2015

Fourth District Court of Appeal Applies Slavin Doctrine in Florida Wrongful Death Suit

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

We generally associate vehicular accidents with the negligence of one of the drivers, but in certain circumstances fault may be attributable to the acts or omissions of a third party. Third-party liability for a death resulting from a Pembroke Pines auto accident is the central topic in a recent decision from Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, McIntosh v. Progressive Design and Engineering, Inc..

In McIntosh, the son of a deceased driver brought suit against the company that designed the traffic signal at the intersection where his father was injured. The intersection where the accident occurred is situated at the exit from a local trailer park. The traffic signal at this intersection allowed a driver exiting the trailer park to rely on a traffic signal further out in the intersection that was intended for other traffic while neglecting the closer traffic signal intended to control traffic exiting the trailer park. While the deceased person was exiting from the trailer park, he collided with a truck traveling southbound on the cross street. The signal design and interconnect plans were developed by Progressive Design and Engineering, Inc. with the input and approval of the Florida Department of Transportation. The plans were eventually approved and sent out for contractor bidding. The construction team generally constructed the intersection per Progressive’s plans. The accident occurred 15 days into the burn-in period, a warranty period when the contractor maintained the traffic signals in case a problem arose. During this period, only the Florida Department of Transportation could order necessary changes.

December 24, 2014

Second District Reverses in Motor Vehicle Negligence Case

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Although a defendant’s ability to pay or otherwise satisfy a plaintiff’s judgment is always of paramount concern in litigation, this issue can be further complicated when the defendant files for bankruptcy during the pendency of a case. Indeed, although a defendant’s motor vehicle insurer is often obligated to pay all or some of a plaintiff’s recovery, the specter of a defendant’s insolvency and the legal rules that apply when bankruptcy proceedings are initiated can nonetheless still create confusion for plaintiffs. This sort of confusion is highlighted in the Second District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Whritenour v. Thompson (PDF-embedded link).

The Whritenour case was commenced following a motor vehicle accident in July 2011. The plaintiff sustained bodily injury as a result of the accident and promptly brought a negligence action against the defendant in January 2012. The defendant had bodily injury liability insurance coverage that was capped at $300,000. The insurer obtained defense counsel, who advised the defendant to file for bankruptcy. Heeding the advice, the defendant filed for bankruptcy in September 2012 and listed the plaintiff’s personal injury claim in the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court then issued an automatic stay of the negligence proceedings. In October, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for relief from the stay of proceedings in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court granted the motion and amended to the stay to permit the plaintiff to “to commence, prosecute, complete […] through final judgment […] claims against [the defendant], for the purpose of pursuing [the defendant’s] insurance carrier and not for the purpose of pursuing personal liability against [the defendant].” Thereafter, the personal injury litigation continued until the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which argued that the she had no personal liability, that the plaintiff’s maximum recovery was limited to the $300,000 policy limit, and that, despite an absence of sworn testimony to that effect, the bankruptcy trustee had no intention of pursuing a bad-faith action against the carrier that could increase the scope of the insurer’s possible obligation. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed to trial and, by effect, a determination of damages because the plaintiff failed to file an action for bad faith prior to the defendant being discharged in bankruptcy. The plaintiff then brought the current appeal.

November 12, 2014

Marcum v. Hayward: Liability for Unconscious Drivers in Florida

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Although a driver having an unanticipated seizure and slamming her vehicle into the vehicle of someone else sounds more like a TV drama than the facts of an actual case, the facts underlying the Second District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Marcum v. Hayward show that situations that sound imaginary can indeed happen in reality.

The Marcum litigation was set into motion by a motor vehicle accident in Central Florida. One of the defendants in the case was driving a vehicle owned by her employer, Artistic Pools of Florida, Inc., and testified that while she was driving she felt she had temporarily lost consciousness, regained it, and then lost it again before she saw paramedics. A fellow employee riding in the car similarly testified that the driver stated she felt she had lost consciousness and that she didn’t feel well. Apparently, she had asked her passenger where they were headed and soon thereafter lost consciousness. The coworker also testified that after the driver lost consciousness he tried to use his hand to engage the brake but was prevented by the seat belt from doing so. After the driver lost consciousness, the vehicle collided with the vehicle of the victim, who said that she found the defendant suffering from a seizure when she walked to her car after the crash. Following the accident, the victim brought suit against the driver, Artistic Pools, and the driver’s auto liability insurer, asserting claims of negligence. The driver moved for a directed verdict, arguing that she could not be found negligent because she had suffered a sudden, unforeseeable seizure, and the time between the onset of this seizure and the crash was insufficient for preventative measures to be taken. The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict.

October 22, 2014

Fourth District Court of Appeal Holds That Prior Jury Determination is Binding in Uninsured Motorist Case

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Uninsured or underinsured motorists are not an uncommon problem in Florida. A recent study conducted by the Insurance Research Council showed that in 2012 Florida ranked second in the nation in the number of uninsured drivers, with approximately 3.2 million of the state’s drivers being uninsured at the time. In fact, Florida had only about a million fewer uninsured drivers than California, even though The Golden State boasts a population nearly twice the size of The Sunshine State. Beyond placing their personal pocketbooks in peril, uninsured and underinsured motorists often create legal hassles for those with whom they happen to collide. The sort of frustrations commonly occasioned by accidents with uninsured motorists are at the center of a recent case from the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Geico General Insurance Company v. Paton. Paton involved a dispute between an injured passenger and an insurance company that refused to pay the full policy limit of uninsured motorist benefits following an accident involving an underinsured motorist.

The plaintiff in Paton was injured in a car accident resulting from the negligence of an underinsured driver on January 1, 2008. The driver’s insurance provider, Geico, paid the injured plaintiff $10,000, which was his policy limit. The injured plaintiff’s mother, however, maintained uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with Geico with a policy limit of $100,000. The injured plaintiff’s attorney made a formal demand to Geico to pay the full policy limit. Geico objected and offered $1,000 in exchange. Subsequent negotiations followed, but Geico never offered more than $5,000 during the course of this back and forth. Eventually, the dispute went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and fixed damages, including present and future pain and suffering, at $469,247. Geico did not move for a new trial, and judgment was entered in the plaintiff’s favor but limited to the $100,000 policy limit. The plaintiff then, with the leave of the court, amended her complaint to include a claim for bad faith under § 624.155 of the Florida Statutes. Before a second trial with respect to the added bad faith claim, the plaintiff moved in limine to exclude evidence of damages from the second trial and fix those damages at the amount that was not recovered at the first trial, $369,247. Geico then moved to exclude from evidence in the bad faith trial the damages awarded in the prior underinsured motorist trial and force the plaintiff to prove bad faith damages anew. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied Geico. After a second trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court awarded damages of $369,247. Geico then appealed.

October 8, 2014

Supreme Court of Florida Answers Certified Question Regarding Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine is a long-established principle of tort law. Under this doctrine, a person with a property interest in a vehicle is vicariously and strictly liable for the injuries that result from negligent operation of that vehicle by a person to whom he or she granted custody of it. Although the principle is well established, questions regarding its application still arise. For example, in one recent case, Christensen v. Bowen, the Supreme Court addressed a question that arose from it, which had been certified to it by the Fifth District Court of Appeal.

Bowen arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in early 2005 when one of the defendants, the former wife of the other defendant, negligently struck and killed another person while operating the vehicle. At the time of the accident, title to the vehicle remained in the name of both the defendants, although the vehicle had been purchased while the defendants were in the process of getting a divorce. At the time of purchase, the then-married defendants signed an application for certificate of title to be issued to them as owner and co-owner. The then-husband never received copy of the certificate of title, since it was mailed to his wife’s address. In addition, the then-husband never had keys or access to the vehicle. Following the accident, the estate of the deceased brought suit against the driver and her former husband. The former wife moved for a directed verdict on the ground that her former husband was an “owner,” but the trial court denied the motion. A jury eventually found that the former husband was not an owner for purposes of applying the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, but his former wife appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not granting her motion for a directed verdict on ownership. The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed but certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a question of great public importance.

August 13, 2014

Fourth District Court of Appeal Reverses Trial Court in Broward Auto-Accident Appeal

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

As the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Marina Dodge, Inc. v. Quinn demonstrates, sometimes the hardest part of a lawsuit is getting the opposing party in court. In Quinn, the Court of Appeals found that the courts of Florida could not exercise personal jurisdiction over two New York auto-retailer corporations that had been sued following a motor vehicle accident in Broward County, Florida.

As noted above, Quinn followed a 2007 motor vehicle accident that led to the serious injury of one of the drivers. The injured driver, the plaintiff in this case, purchased the vehicle involved in the crash in New York four years earlier, when she was still a resident there. Sometime after this transaction but before the accident, the driver relocated to South Florida, where she now resides. After the crash, the seriously injured driver sued the other driver involved in the accident as well as Marina Dodge, Inc. and Webster Auto Brokers, Inc., two New York auto retailing corporations, in the Broward County Circuit Court. With respect to the auto retailers’ liability, the plaintiff argued that the vehicle she purchased in New York was defective and that the defective condition led to the accident and thus her injuries. The corporations both moved to have the claims against them dismissed, arguing that the courts of Florida could not exercise jurisdiction over them. The trial court, however, denied both motions, stating that the corporations had “continuous contact that took place over years with various entities sufficient to permit jurisdiction to lie in the State of Florida.”

Despite the trial court’s certainty on the question of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal reversed in a unanimous decision. Generally, there are two ways for a plaintiff to show that a court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. First, one can show that the court had specific jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction to exist, one must first show that the state’s long-arm-statute covers the acts at issue in the suit. If that prong is met, one must then show that there exist sufficient “minimum contacts” between the out-of-state defendant and the state where jurisdiction is sought. For there to be sufficient “minimum contacts,” one must generally demonstrate that the defendant “deliberately [engaged] in significant activities within a State or has created “continuing obligations” between himself and residents of the [state]” such that “he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there.”Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (U.S. 1985) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Alternatively, one can show that general jurisdiction exists. Since the Florida long-arm-statute provision for general jurisdiction is read coextensively with the constitutional requirement for general jurisdiction, see Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So.3d 245, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (pdf downloadable link), one must just show that the defendant engaged in “continuous, substantial, and systematic” contact with the state.
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