Negligence Category Archives — Page 8 of 9 — South Florida Injury Attorneys Blog Published by South Florida Injury Lawyers

August 20, 2014

Supreme Court of Florida Reverses in Pinecrest Personal Injury Case

A night at the bar with friends does not typically end with someone wielding a tomahawk, but as you will see below, the facts of the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Dorsey v. Reider are not like those of a typical personal injury case.

In Dorsey, the plaintiff was injured at the conclusion of a night of imbibing with the defendant and another man with whom the defendant was acquainted at a bar in Pinecrest, Florida. On that night, the defendant, who was the friend of the plaintiff in this case, became increasingly belligerent and was threatening to fight others. In light of his friend’s conduct, the plaintiff used a few choice words to tell the defendant his behavior was obnoxious and proceeded to leave. The defendant and his friend followed. As the plaintiff walked through the parking lot, his path took him between the defendant’s truck and an adjacent vehicle. The defendant ran to the other side while the plaintiff was passing between the vehicles and blocked the plaintiff’s path as the acquaintance blocked him in on the other side. An argument ensued, which lasted for several minutes before the plaintiff heard the truck door open and turned to find that the acquaintance had procured a tomahawk from the truck. The plaintiff then asked the defendant, “What is this?” The defendant did not respond, and the plaintiff then attempted to push the defendant aside in order to escape. After about 15 seconds of struggle, the plaintiff was struck in the head with the tomahawk, which rendered him unconscious. The defendant and the acquaintance then fled. Sometime thereafter, the plaintiff awoke and drove himself to the hospital. As a result of the attack, the plaintiff suffered a variety of serious injuries and continues to suffer from blurred vision, dizziness, and chronic headaches.

Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff brought suit for his injuries. Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded over 1.5 million dollars in damages. On appeal, the Florida Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court decision. The Court of Appeal determined that the defendant, who did not actually strike the victim with the tomahawk, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff in this case, since there was “no evidence [the defendant] “colluded with [the acquaintance] or knew that [the acquaintance] had the tomahawk and would strike.” Reider v. Dorsey, 98 So.3d 1228 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). The Supreme Court of Florida, however, determined that this holding was in error.
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August 6, 2014

Workplace Fatalities on the Rise in Broward County

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

In a recent article, the Sun Sentinel examined the sudden rise in the number of workplace fatalities in Broward County, Florida. Although the post-recession rejuvenation of South Florida’s construction market is welcome news economically, increased demand for construction work has, according to sources in the story, led to the hiring of more inexperienced workers and failure to adhere to basic safety precautions, such as the installation of guardrails and the proper rigging of worksite machinery. Alarmingly, there have been 11 work-related deaths in Florida so far this year, including six in Broward County since the beginning of June. The most recent death occurred at a car dealership construction site in Fort Lauderdale, where a beam collapsed and knocked several workers off a ladder. In response to this sudden rise in fatalities, local members of Safety Alliance for Excellence (SAFE), a collaborative organization of contractors based in Miami, are set to meet with officials from the local office of the federal Occupational Safety & Health Administration to discuss the measures that should be taken to address the problem.

Like almost all other states, Florida has a workers’ compensation scheme that governs liability and financial recovery for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. The provisions of Florida’s workers’ compensation scheme are codified in Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes. Pursuant to § 440.10, all contractors and subcontractors engaged in either private or public construction in the state are required to maintain workers’ compensation insurance coverage for their employees. Pursuant to § 440.11, the workers’ compensation scheme is the exclusive remedy for liability arising from injury or death resulting from workplace accidents. It immunizes employers from common law negligence liability.

There are only two narrow exceptions from the exclusivity provision of the scheme. These are if the employer fails to secure payment as provided by the provisions of the workers’ compensation scheme, or if the employer commits an intentional tort causing the injury or death of the employee. See §§ 440.11(a)-(b). For the purposes of the second exception, an employer’s actions are deemed to constitute an intentional tort only if they are either deliberately intended to injure the victim or constitute conduct the employer knew, based on prior similar accidents or explicit warning, was virtually certain to result in injury or death. Furthermore, the employee must have been unaware of the attendant risks because the danger was either unapparent or deliberately concealed or misrepresented by the employer. See § 440.11(b).
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July 30, 2014

Federal Court Dismisses Several Counts in Personal Injury Case Following Cruise Ship Accident

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

As the home of two of America’s three busiest cruise ship ports and the headquarters of numerous cruise companies, the South Florida metropolitan area hosts a considerable amount of litigation involving personal injury at sea. A common surprise to many litigants, however, is that Florida law does not apply in these actions. Instead, federal admiralty law, also known as maritime law, controls the disposition of recovery for those harmed aboard ships on navigable waters. One recent case, Gandhi v. Carnival Corporation, demonstrates how application of admiralty law can limit the possibility of full recovery for those injured on cruise ships and the importance of understanding the nuances of this distinct body of law.

In Gandhi, parents of a child injured aboard a Carnival Cruise Lines ship brought suit against the company, both personally and on their daughter’s behalf. The plaintiffs’ daughter was injured while standing in a ship elevator when one of her arms was drawn into a space into which an elevator door was closing. Although her arm was ensnared, the elevator door attempted to open and close several times, a process which continued until a fellow passenger freed the arm with assistance of a chair leg. As a result, the child suffered a deep laceration to one of her elbows, severing of several tendons, and a fracture. Her father, who witnessed the entire ordeal, further alleged to have suffered severe emotional trauma. The parents brought suit against Carnival in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida for the following claims: a negligence claim for damages of the minor child, a claim for damages pursuant to the negligent infliction of emotional distress, a damages claim for medical expenses incurred, and a damages claim relating to the loss of filial consortium. Carnival brought a motion to strike provisions from the first claim and to dismiss the remaining claims, and the court, applying admiralty law, sided with Carnival.

First, as a preliminary matter, the court noted that general maritime law controlled in this action and that neither general common law nor state law would be consulted unless there was an absence of maritime law on an issue to be decided. Next, the court moved to the plaintiffs’ claim of negligence. Although Carnival did not move to dismiss this claim, it did move to strike parts of the pleading that appeared to improperly assert the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Generally, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits a jury or other fact-finder to infer negligence when the circumstances of person’s injury are of a variety that usually does not occur in the absence of negligence. Although maritime law allows for the inference of res ipsa loquitur to be raised in a claim for negligence, the court agreed that is was improper to raise the doctrine in the pleadings, since res ipsa loquitur is not a cause of action but rather an evidentiary principle on which a court may, in its discretion, later instruct the jury. Next, the court turned to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Although Florida law allows a relative bystander to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when he witnesses the negligent injury of a loved one and suffers emotional trauma leading to demonstrable physical harm as a result, see Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1985), maritime law adheres to the “zone of danger” test. Pursuant to this standard, one may not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless he or she “sustain[s] a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or [is] placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.” Although the father in this case witnessed the injury of his daughter, there were no facts suggesting that he was in an imminent zone of danger. Accordingly, pursuant to the standard set forth in maritime law, the father could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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July 23, 2014

Florida Court Holds that Parents Not Liable for Adult Son’s Assault on Relatives

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

In the aftermath of tragedy, it is a natural reaction to assign blame to others, whether attribution is justified or not. This impulse is at the heart of the Fourth District Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Knight v. Merhige, in which the court held that the parents of a man who fatally shot several relatives at a family gathering on Thanksgiving of 2009 could not be held liable for their son’s conduct. Although the decision will likely do little to mend fractured intra-familial ties, the Fourth District’s holding demarcates a clear line with respect to when someone may be held liable for the conduct of another.

As noted above, the suit at issue follows a tragic incident on November 26, 2009. On that day, the son of the defendants in this case, who was 35 at the time, retrieved a gun during an annual family get-together and fatally shot four of his relatives, including both of his sisters, and seriously injured another. After the shooting, the son pled guilty to the murders and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The son had a long history of violence and mental health issues and had on several previous occasions threatened and assaulted members of his family. Although he had been prohibited from attending Thanksgiving festivities the year before at the request of the relatives who were hosting, his parents invited him to attend in 2009 without either seeking permission of the hosts or informing other family members. Until shortly before the shooting, the son lived with the parents, but his parents had recently elected to set up him up in his own condominium while continuing to provide him with financial support, some of which was used to procure firearms. A housekeeper who cleaned the son’s condominium and routinely reported to parents informed them that he had ceased attending mental health treatment and taking medication.

Given the context of the son’s assault, relatives brought three separate wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits against the parents, which were consolidated for appeal. Although they were distinct, the suits were predicated on similar theories of negligence. Specifically, the lawsuits alleged the following: 1) by furtively inviting their son, the parents created a “foreseeable zone of risk” for the relatives, and they failed to exercise prudent care in managing the risk they created; and 2) the parents had a “special relationship” to their son such that they had to duty to exercise reasonable care in his “supervision, guidance, control, direction, security, monitoring and management,” and failure to exercise reasonable care amounted to a breach of this duty. The trial court dismissed each of the suits, noting the general rule that “there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to another,” and holding that the respective plaintiffs had failed to overcome the burden of demonstrating a special relationship that would give rise to a legal duty to control the son’s conduct. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissals.

June 25, 2014

Palm Beach Teen Takes the Stand in Medical Malpractice Case

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Seventeen years after his mother was involuntarily administered laxatives by medical professionals acting at the behest of federal agents, Jordan Taylor took the stand in a Miami-Dade County Courthouse on Monday to discuss the circumstances of his life that could be linked to that regrettable event.

On February 14, 1997, Taylor’s mother was detained by Customs Enforcement agents who suspected she was smuggling drugs into the United States. For the following three days, the mother, who is a U.S. citizen by birth and was seven months pregnant at the time, was held at Jackson Memorial Hospital, where medical professionals acting under the direction of the aforementioned Customs officials administered prescription laxatives in order to determine whether she was in fact carrying drugs.

The laxative administered to her, called GoLytely, had not been recommended for pregnant women in 1997, and its effects had not yet been studied in either pregnant women or pregnant animals. According to the complaint, Taylor’s mother complained of abdominal pain and vaginal bleeding, but pressure to take the laxative persisted. Shortly after this unwanted stay at Jackson Memorial, she prematurely gave birth to Taylor.

June 18, 2014

Davie Police Identify Men Involved in Possible Wrong-Way Driving Accident

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

On Wednesday, June 18, 2014, police identified the two men who were injured on Tuesday in a possible wrong-way motor vehicle accident on a stretch of State Road 84 in Davie. Dale Engle, the Davie Police Captain, identified the man reported to have been driving west in the eastbound lanes of State Road 84 before colliding with a black pickup truck. Prior to the accident, police had received several calls about a “reckless” driver headed in the wrong direction on State Road 84.

Police are still in the process of investigating the crash, but Captain Engle said that neither drugs nor alcohol appear to have contributed to the crash. He further noted that, although the roads were wet, weather conditions did not seem to have been a factor.

The driver of the vehicle headed in the wrong direction, who resides in Miami, may have, according to Engle, been unfamiliar with the roads in the area, which have been under construction for an extended period of time as Interstate 595 is widened. The driver of the black pickup truck, who was treated at Broward Health Medical Center for broken bones in his feet, is conscious and said he did not remember seeing the other vehicle before the collision.

May 28, 2014

Conceding Liability: A Good Strategy?

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Typically, the thought of conceding liability in a negligence suit runs counter to conventional legal strategy. In fact, attorneys often spend considerable time trying to counteract even banal admissions that occur prior to formal litigation that could be construed as declarations of liability. However, a recent case coming from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeals demonstrates how a proactive admission of guilt can occasionally work in a defendant’s favor.

In Swanson v. Robles, the Second District Court of Appeals held that allowing evidence of a defendant’s drug use during the first phase of a trial when the defendant had already admitted liability for both compensatory and punitive damages was reversible error. The case arose from a traffic accident in October 2008. A truck being driven by the defendant struck a vehicle owned by the City of Tampa and a city employee who was unloading traffic counters at the rear of the vehicle. The city employee died immediately following the collision, and his estate brought a wrongful death action against the driver, seeking both compensatory damages for the deceased’s widow and compensatory and punitive damages for the estate. The defendant brought a motion to bifurcate the trial, so that evidence of his drug use (Xanax, methadone, and marijuana) would not be admitted and prejudice the jury. In light of his admission of liability, the defendant argued that such evidence was no longer probative with respect to determining whether or not he was liable for compensatory damages and punitive damages or for determining the amount of compensatory damages. The evidence was not excluded, and the defendant brought an appeal, arguing that permitting the evidence was in error.

The Second District Court of Appeal agreed. The Court found that, since the defendant had conceded liability with respect to both compensatory and punitive damages, evidence of his drug use was no longer relevant for determining liability for either sort of damages or with respect to determining the amount of compensatory damages. Although compensatory damages include “pain and suffering,” the court held that possible knowledge of drug use was not probative for determining the amount of damages reflecting loss of companionship and protection. In addition, the court held that, while evidence of drug use may be probative with respect to determining the amount of punitive damages, the amount of those damages would be handled in the second stage of the bifurcated trial, and thus the evidence of the drug use only served to inflame the jury during the first stage and lead to a possibly higher assessment of compensatory damages.

May 21, 2014

Garcia v. Target: When Does a Business have Knowledge of a Dangerous Condition?

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

In 2010, the Florida Legislature made sweeping changes to Florida law regarding slip and fall liability for business owners. In that year, the legislature enacted § 768.0755 of the Florida Statutes, which formally requires that a plaintiff in a “slip and fall” case prove that the business where he or she was injured had “knowledge” of the dangerous condition that caused the fall. Since proving knowledge of a dangerous condition is now a formal statutory requirement for establishing slip and fall liability, it is important to understand how a plaintiff would go about making such a showing.

Typically, there are two ways a plaintiff can prove that a business had knowledge or “notice” of the dangerous condition. First, he or she can prove that the business had actual notice by proving an employee had been warned or otherwise informed about the condition. However, this is a difficult avenue to pursue, since an injured plaintiff does not generally have full access to the information necessary to determine which, if any, employees had been warned about a dangerous condition. In addition, employees, even if they can be identified, will generally not be forthcoming with that information. The second and more common method of establishing knowledge of a dangerous condition is known as “constructive notice.” To show “constructive notice,” a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence related to the nature and duration of the dangerous condition that tends to show that employees who engage in reasonable inspection would have known of the dangerous condition.

In a recent decision from the Southern District of Florida, the court examined the sort of evidence that would be sufficient for showing constructive notice of a dangerous condition. In Garcia v. Target, the court determined whether a plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment and thus let a jury determine whether there was constructive notice of a dangerous condition. In Garcia, a customer slipped and fell on a wet surface while she was leaving a Target located in Davie, Florida. Target argued that the plaintiff had failed to proffer evidence sufficient to satisfy her burden of proving constructive notice of the wet surface, in part because it had not been raining the day the plaintiff fell and the plaintiff acknowledged she had not seen the dangerous condition prior to slipping nor knew how long it had been there prior to falling.

May 14, 2014

Florida Senate and House of Representatives Pass the Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

On Tuesday, April 22, the Florida House of Representatives unanimously voted in favor of enacting the Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act, legislation that stiffens penalties for hit-and-run drivers. This follows the March 26 unanimous vote of the Florida Senate in favor of the Act, which will now go to the Governor’s desk for approval and signature. The Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act is the product of an unfortunate death of a cyclist who was hit while riding on the Rickenbacker Causeway in February 2012.

The hit-and-run driver, who was on probation for cocaine charges and was driving with a suspended license, had been carousing at a bar in Coconut Grove shortly before the 6 AM accident. After he hit the deceased person and another cyclist, the driver did not stop to offer assistance or wait for the authorities. Instead, he continued his journey home, where he concealed the damaged vehicle under a tarp. By the time he eventually surrendered to authorities, 18 hours after the accident, the police were unable to take a timely blood alcohol test. Inability to ascertain the driver’s blood alcohol level helped him avoid manslaughter charges. The driver eventually pled guilty to charges of driving with a suspended license, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, and leaving the scene of an accident involving great bodily harm. The driver was sentenced to only one year in prison and only served 264 days of the sentence.

The Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act seeks to eliminate the incentive hit-and-run drivers have in leaving the scene of an accident. The new law amends Florida’s Leaving the Scene of an Accident Law, which was enacted in 1971. The law creates a mandatory minimum sentence of three, seven, or 10 years for leaving the scene of an accident, depending on whether a person was injured, seriously injured, or fatally injured. The legislation also increases the mandatory minimum sentence for leaving the scene of an accident while under the influence of alcohol from two years to 10 years and provides for a three-year revocation of the offender’s license. By imposing these mandatory minimums, lawmakers hope that hit-and-run drivers, especially those under the influence of alcohol or drugs, will no longer see any incentive in fleeing.
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May 7, 2014

Fourth District Court of Appeal Certifies Conflict with Third District Regarding “Slip and Fall” Liability to Supreme Court of Florida

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Although many would believe, given the frequency of “slip and fall” accidents, that the law in the area should be well settled, Florida law regarding business owners’ “slip and fall” liability has been in considerable flux for the past decade. On February 26, the Fourth District Court of Appeals injected further confusion into the state of the law when it issued its opinion in Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder. In McGruder, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that recent legislation altering the liability of business owners in slip and fall cases should not be applied retroactively to accidents that occurred prior to implementation of the legislation. However, this holding, as the Court in McGruder noted, is in direct conflict with an earlier Third District opinion that held that the legislation should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the Fourth District certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida for resolution.

This story of “slip and fall” instability began in 2001, when the Supreme Court of Florida rendered its decision in Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.. In Owens, the Supreme Court of Florida held that “the existence of a foreign substance on the floor of a business premises that causes a customer to fall and be injured is not a safe condition and the existence of that unsafe condition creates a rebuttable presumption that the business owner did not maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 331 (Fla. 2001). Thus, “once the plaintiff establishes that he or she fell as a result of a transitory foreign substance, a rebuttable presumption of negligence arises.” Id. In response to this holding, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted § 768.0710, which eliminated the burden-shifting scheme adopted in Owens and provided that an injured “slip and fall” plaintiff must prove that the business owner “acted negligently by failing to exercise reasonable care” without the benefit of any presumption. However, actual or constructive knowledge of the transitory substance was still not required. This changed in 2010, when the Florida Legislature repealed § 768.0710 and enacted § 768.0755, aptly titled “Premises Liability for Transitory Foreign Substances in a Business Establishment.” The new statute is fundamentally the same as the former, except that the plaintiff needs to now prove that the business establishment had notice, actual or constructive, of the “dangerous condition.”

In McGruder, the plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall at a mall prior to the enactment of § 768.0755 but filed suit after the implementation of the legislation. Accordingly, the key question is whether § 768.0755 should be applied to the case or if the law outlined in § 768.0710 should apply. With respect to retroactive application of statutes, the courts of Florida apply a two-prong test: 1) did the legislature manifest clear intent for the statute to apply retroactively and 2) absent clear intent, is the statute substantive, procedural, or remedial. Generally, absent clear intent, a substantive statute is not to be applied retroactively, but a procedural or remedial statute should be applied retroactively. Although the Third District had concluded in an earlier decision that the statute was not substantive and, thus, should be applied retroactively, the Fourth District held that requiring notice altered the elements of the claim in such a fashion that the new legislation was substantive and should only be applied prospectively.
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