South Florida Injury Attorneys Blog

May 21, 2014

Garcia v. Target: When Does a Business have Knowledge of a Dangerous Condition?

In 2010, the Florida Legislature made sweeping changes to Florida law regarding slip and fall liability for business owners. In that year, the legislature enacted § 768.0755 of the Florida Statutes, which formally requires that a plaintiff in a “slip and fall” case prove that the business where he or she was injured had “knowledge” of the dangerous condition that caused the fall. Since proving knowledge of a dangerous condition is now a formal statutory requirement for establishing slip and fall liability, it is important to understand how a plaintiff would go about making such a showing.

Typically, there are two ways a plaintiff can prove that a business had knowledge or “notice” of the dangerous condition. First, he or she can prove that the business had actual notice by proving an employee had been warned or otherwise informed about the condition. However, this is a difficult avenue to pursue, since an injured plaintiff does not generally have full access to the information necessary to determine which, if any, employees had been warned about a dangerous condition. In addition, employees, even if they can be identified, will generally not be forthcoming with that information. The second and more common method of establishing knowledge of a dangerous condition is known as “constructive notice.” To show “constructive notice,” a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence related to the nature and duration of the dangerous condition that tends to show that employees who engage in reasonable inspection would have known of the dangerous condition.

In a recent decision from the Southern District of Florida, the court examined the sort of evidence that would be sufficient for showing constructive notice of a dangerous condition. In Garcia v. Target, the court determined whether a plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment and thus let a jury determine whether there was constructive notice of a dangerous condition. In Garcia, a customer slipped and fell on a wet surface while she was leaving a Target located in Davie, Florida. Target argued that the plaintiff had failed to proffer evidence sufficient to satisfy her burden of proving constructive notice of the wet surface, in part because it had not been raining the day the plaintiff fell and the plaintiff acknowledged she had not seen the dangerous condition prior to slipping nor knew how long it had been there prior to falling.

May 14, 2014

Florida Senate and House of Representatives Pass the Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

On Tuesday, April 22, the Florida House of Representatives unanimously voted in favor of enacting the Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act, legislation that stiffens penalties for hit-and-run drivers. This follows the March 26 unanimous vote of the Florida Senate in favor of the Act, which will now go to the Governor’s desk for approval and signature. The Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act is the product of an unfortunate death of a cyclist who was hit while riding on the Rickenbacker Causeway in February 2012.

The hit-and-run driver, who was on probation for cocaine charges and was driving with a suspended license, had been carousing at a bar in Coconut Grove shortly before the 6 AM accident. After he hit the deceased person and another cyclist, the driver did not stop to offer assistance or wait for the authorities. Instead, he continued his journey home, where he concealed the damaged vehicle under a tarp. By the time he eventually surrendered to authorities, 18 hours after the accident, the police were unable to take a timely blood alcohol test. Inability to ascertain the driver’s blood alcohol level helped him avoid manslaughter charges. The driver eventually pled guilty to charges of driving with a suspended license, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, and leaving the scene of an accident involving great bodily harm. The driver was sentenced to only one year in prison and only served 264 days of the sentence.

The Aaron Cohen Life Protection Act seeks to eliminate the incentive hit-and-run drivers have in leaving the scene of an accident. The new law amends Florida’s Leaving the Scene of an Accident Law, which was enacted in 1971. The law creates a mandatory minimum sentence of three, seven, or 10 years for leaving the scene of an accident, depending on whether a person was injured, seriously injured, or fatally injured. The legislation also increases the mandatory minimum sentence for leaving the scene of an accident while under the influence of alcohol from two years to 10 years and provides for a three-year revocation of the offender’s license. By imposing these mandatory minimums, lawmakers hope that hit-and-run drivers, especially those under the influence of alcohol or drugs, will no longer see any incentive in fleeing.
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May 7, 2014

Fourth District Court of Appeal Certifies Conflict with Third District Regarding “Slip and Fall” Liability to Supreme Court of Florida

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Although many would believe, given the frequency of “slip and fall” accidents, that the law in the area should be well settled, Florida law regarding business owners’ “slip and fall” liability has been in considerable flux for the past decade. On February 26, the Fourth District Court of Appeals injected further confusion into the state of the law when it issued its opinion in Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder. In McGruder, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that recent legislation altering the liability of business owners in slip and fall cases should not be applied retroactively to accidents that occurred prior to implementation of the legislation. However, this holding, as the Court in McGruder noted, is in direct conflict with an earlier Third District opinion that held that the legislation should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the Fourth District certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida for resolution.

This story of “slip and fall” instability began in 2001, when the Supreme Court of Florida rendered its decision in Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.. In Owens, the Supreme Court of Florida held that “the existence of a foreign substance on the floor of a business premises that causes a customer to fall and be injured is not a safe condition and the existence of that unsafe condition creates a rebuttable presumption that the business owner did not maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 331 (Fla. 2001). Thus, “once the plaintiff establishes that he or she fell as a result of a transitory foreign substance, a rebuttable presumption of negligence arises.” Id. In response to this holding, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted § 768.0710, which eliminated the burden-shifting scheme adopted in Owens and provided that an injured “slip and fall” plaintiff must prove that the business owner “acted negligently by failing to exercise reasonable care” without the benefit of any presumption. However, actual or constructive knowledge of the transitory substance was still not required. This changed in 2010, when the Florida Legislature repealed § 768.0710 and enacted § 768.0755, aptly titled “Premises Liability for Transitory Foreign Substances in a Business Establishment.” The new statute is fundamentally the same as the former, except that the plaintiff needs to now prove that the business establishment had notice, actual or constructive, of the “dangerous condition.”

In McGruder, the plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall at a mall prior to the enactment of § 768.0755 but filed suit after the implementation of the legislation. Accordingly, the key question is whether § 768.0755 should be applied to the case or if the law outlined in § 768.0710 should apply. With respect to retroactive application of statutes, the courts of Florida apply a two-prong test: 1) did the legislature manifest clear intent for the statute to apply retroactively and 2) absent clear intent, is the statute substantive, procedural, or remedial. Generally, absent clear intent, a substantive statute is not to be applied retroactively, but a procedural or remedial statute should be applied retroactively. Although the Third District had concluded in an earlier decision that the statute was not substantive and, thus, should be applied retroactively, the Fourth District held that requiring notice altered the elements of the claim in such a fashion that the new legislation was substantive and should only be applied prospectively.
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April 28, 2014

Can I File A Lawsuit in Florida if I was Injured in a Trucking Accident?

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

If you have recently been involved in a Florida truck accident, you understand how difficult being involved in an accident can make your life. Even after you recover from the immediate physical injuries caused by the accident, there are often lingering physical effects of the injuries. In addition, there are the mounting medical bills.

For this reason, the State of Florida allows truck accident victims to bring a civil suit for damages to recover from the driver who caused the accident.

Typical Causes of Florida Truck Accidents

Semi-trucks are the biggest vehicles on the road. They are often weighed down with thousands of pounds of cargo and therefore can be extremely dangerous when not operated properly. While semi-truck drivers are required to have special licenses to operate the large trucks, even professional drivers make mistakes and errors in judgment.

April 23, 2014

Florida Supreme Court Rules Statutory Caps on Non-Economic Damages Unconstitutional as Applied in Wrongful Death Medical Malpractice Case

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

After months of anticipation, the Supreme Court of Florida has issued its much-awaited decision in Estate of McCall v. United States of America. In a heavily divided opinion that spans nearly 100 pages, the majority of the court held that Florida’s statutorily imposed caps on wrongful death non-economic damages in medical negligence actions violate the right to equal protection afforded by the Florida Constitution. Although family members of the deceased person who died while receiving medical care from Air Force clinicians will welcome the news, the split decision leaves many unanswered questions that will likely need to be hashed out in other decisions.

In February of 2006, the deceased, McCall, was receiving care from family practice clinicians at a United States Air Force clinic when test results showed that her blood pressure was high and that she was suffering from severe preeclampsia, which required that labor be induced immediately. McCall eventually gave birth, but she later went into shock and cardiac arrest as a result of severe blood loss that occurred during the course of her labor and several associated treatments. Following this episode, McCall never regained consciousness and was removed from life support shortly thereafter.

This case arrived at the Supreme Court of Florida in somewhat atypical fashion. This wrongful death action was originally brought in Federal District Court, and the United States was found liable for McCall’s death. The federal court determined that there were economic damages amounting to nearly $ 1 million and non-economic damages amounting to $2 million, including $500,000 for the McCall’s son and $750,000 for each of McCall’s parents. Despite this finding, the Federal Tort Claims Act states that damages are to be determined using the law of the state where the tortious act occurred. Accordingly, the District Court applied Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death non-economic damages in medical negligence actions, codified as § 766.118 of the Florida Statues. The law limits non-economic damage recovery from all defendants to $1 million in this type of suit, irrespective of the number of claimants. The decision was appealed, and the Federal Appeals Court upheld the application of the cap on damages, holding the cap did not constitute a taking under either Florida law or federal law and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, since federal courts avoid rendering decisions with respect to unsettled state law, the federal Appeals Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify several questions to the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the interpretation of Florida constitutional law .

April 16, 2014

Update: Supreme Court of Florida to Address Several Questions Left in the Wake of McCall Decision

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Fewer than five months after its formative opinion in McCall v. United States, the Supreme Court of Florida will once again examine the legality of Florida’s statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical negligence suits. On June 4, the court will hear the oral argument in Miles v. Weingrad, which raises the question of whether caps on recovery of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice negligence actions can be retroactively applied to claims that accrued prior to implementation of the statutory cap legislation. The court originally granted discretionary review of Miles before its decision in McCall and has now requested supplemental briefing on the effect of the McCall decision on the case at hand. In particular, Miles affords the court an opportunity to address both the constitutionality of statutory caps in personal injury medical negligence cases and the question of whether the McCall decision should be applied only prospectively.

To say that the Miles case has been in court for quite some time would be an understatement. The case was originally brought in January 2006. The plaintiffs, Miles and her husband, sued a physician whom they solicited for a second opinion on whether a different physician had completely removed a cancerous melanoma. The physician, Weingrad, informed them that the first physician had not completely excised the entire tumor, and Miles underwent a second surgery. Miles and her husband later found out that the second surgery was unnecessary, since the first physician had, in fact, removed all traces of the melanoma. Unfortunately, the second surgery came with complications, including infection and persistent swelling that continues to hinder her mobility. After a trial, the jury awarded $1.5 million in non-economic damages and a little over $16,000 in economic damages. However, the defendant requested that the trial court apply newly implemented statutory provisions that apply aggregate caps on the recovery of non-economic damages in medical negligence suits. The trial court refused to impose the statutory cap, since the cause of action had accrued nine months prior to the effective date of the legislation. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals overturned the trial court decision and held that the statutory cap may be imposed retroactively.

After further appeals and remands, the Miles case now finds itself before the Supreme Court of Florida. However, in light of the recent McCall decision, the disposition of the case carries import beyond the original question it raised. In McCall, the court specifically eschewed addressing the constitutionality of aggregate statutory caps on non-economic damages in actions beyond wrongful death actions. Miles, however, is a personal injury medical malpractice case and provides the court the opportunity to address the constitutionality of statutory caps as applied in these actions. If you remember, the same statutory provisions on non-economic damage caps govern both types of wrongful death and personal injury medical negligence actions.

April 9, 2014

A Review of “Examination Under Oath” and “Independent Medical Examination” Provisions for PIP Benefits

by Frankl Kominsky Injury Lawyers

Although Florida instituted a no-fault insurance scheme to assure swift recovery for auto accident victims and dissuade needless litigation involving small claims, insurers have often conditioned the receipt of benefits in various ways that have made the benefit acquisition process increasingly protracted and involved. Two common provisions that insurers incorporate into their no-fault contracts are the requirement that the insured submit to an “Examination Under Oath” (EUO) prior to receiving benefits and the requirement that the insured undergo an “Independent Medical Examination” (IME) if he or she is seeking coverage for treatment of a physical injury.

In June of last year, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered a decision in Nunez v. Geico, which took a strong stance related to the propriety of EUO provisions. In Nunez, the court held that although the PIP statute, § 627.736 Florida Statutes, is silent with respect to EUOs, delaying or denying coverage based on the insured’s failure to submit to an oral examination under oath was inconsistent with the statutory goal under § 627.736 “of ensuring swift and virtually automatic payment of benefits” and, thus, invalid. Geico noted concerns related to fraud, but the majority held that an insurer concerned about fraud could make use of § 627.736(6)(c), which allows for court-ordered discovery upon a showing of good cause. In reaching this decision, the court compared EUOs to Independent Medical Exams, the latter of which are directly addressed and permitted under § 627.736.

Although the court staked a strong position in Nunez, the impact of the decision is limited. Before the court even rendered its opinion, the Florida Legislature passed new laws that amended the PIP statute in order to permit EUOs in no-fault insurance policies. Accordingly, only PIP claims delayed or denied prior to implementation of the legislation are affected by the Nunez decision. In addition, the new legislation modified the preexisting IME provisions to allow an insurer to deny coverage when the insured has unreasonably failed to attend a scheduled IME. Failing to attend two scheduled IMEs creates a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness.